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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CASEY CRAIG WEAVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070141-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Jc it * 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony. R. 76-79; 105: 2-7. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendant was pulled over for driving an uninsured, unregistered car that he did 
not own. During the investigation, defendant's passenger was arrested for providing 
officers with false identification. Officers subsequently decided to impound the car. 
Issue la: Were officers constitutionally required to provide defendant with an 
opportunity to remove a backpack from the backseat prior to conducting an inventory 
search of the car? 
Issue lb: Were officers constitutionally required to provide defendant with an 
opportunity to remove a backpack from the backseat prior to conducting a search incident 
to the arrest of his passenger? 
Standard of Review: Questions of constitutional interpretation are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, f 7, 139 P.3d 1066. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a first degree felony, one count of driving without insurance, a Class 
B misdemeanor, one count of driving without registration, a Class C misdemeanor, and 
one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor. R. 35-36. 
Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been 
obtained during the search of the vehicle, arguing that the search had been 
unconstitutional. R. 62-63. In response, the State argued that the search was justified as 
either an inventory search or as a search incident to the arrest of defendant's passenger. 
R. 50-55. Following argument, the trial court orally denied defendant's motion. R. 42-
2 
43; 104: 12. The court did not enter findings with respect to its ruling, nor did it specify 
the legal grounds it was relying on. R. 42-43; 104: 12. 
Following the denial of defendant's motion to suppress, defendant entered a 
conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony. R. 76-79; 105: 2-7. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 92-94. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
At approximately 3:10 a.m. on September 3, 2005, defendant was pulled over for 
driving an uninsured, unregistered car. R. 50. After defendant informed the officer that 
he did not own the vehicle, the officer asked defendant's passenger for identification in 
an effort to determine whether she was the vehicle's owner. R. 50-51. Defendant's 
passenger provided the officer with a false name and was accordingly arrested. R. 53-54. 
The officer subsequently impounded the vehicle and conducted an inventory 
search. R. 51. During the inventory search, the officer found a black backpack in the 
back seat. R. 51. When the officer opened the backpack, he found drugs, drug 
paraphernalia, and documents with defendant's name on them. R. 51. As a result, 
defendant was arrested. R. 51. 
Defense counsel "stipulate[d] to the facts" during the suppression hearing below. 
R. 104: 3. The following facts are accordingly taken from the State's memorandum in 
opposition to defendant's motion to suppress. R. 50-55. 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the officer violated his constitutional rights by failing to 
provide him with the opportunity to remove his personal property from the vehicle prior 
to the inventory search. The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have both specifically held that officers are not required to provide owners with an 
opportunity to remove property prior to an inventory search. Defendant's claim should 
accordingly be rejected. 
In the alternative, this Court can affirm on the grounds that the search was incident 
to the arrest of defendant's passenger. Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, 
officers can search backpacks that are found within the interior of a car after an occupant 
of the car has been arrested. Contrary to defendant's claim, officers are not required to 
provide passengers with the opportunity to remove their property prior to such a search. 
Defendant's claim should accordingly be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE NOT 
VIOLATED BY THE SEARCH IN THIS CASE 
In the pleadings below, the State advanced two independent justifications for the 
search: (1) the inventory search doctrine, and (2) the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
Defendant argues that neither doctrine is applicable in this case. Defendant's arguments 
should be rejected.2 
2
 As discussed above, the trial court failed to specify the ground it was relying on. 
"[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record,. . . and this is true even though such 
4 
A. Officers were not required to allow defendant to remove personal 
property from the vehicle before conducting an inventory search. 
In challenging the inventory search, defendant does not argue that the initial stop 
was improper, nor does he argue that the decisions to impound the vehicle and conduct an 
inventory search were in any way improper. Aplt. Br. 11 ("[TJhere is no question that the 
officer had a right [to] pull over the vehicle which the Defendant was driving . . . " ) ; Aplt. 
Br. 14 ("The officer had the right to impound the vehicle and perform an inventory search 
. . ."). Defendant also does not argue that South Ogden's impound and inventory search 
procedures are constitutionally defective or that the officer failed to properly comply with 
those procedures in this case. Instead, defendant only argues that the officer was required 
to ask him whether he wanted to remove any property from the vehicle prior to beginning 
the inventory search. Aplt. Br. 6-18. This argument is contrary to settled law and should 
be rejected. 
"An inventory search of an automobile is a well-settled exception to the warrant 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Gray, 
851 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah App. 1993). Under this doctrine, officers are entitled to 
"conduct an inventory search of a properly impounded vehicle in good faith following 
reasonable, standardized procedures." Id. at 1221; see also State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
267-68 (Utah 1985). "Inventory searches are deemed necessary to: (1) protect individual 
property in police custody; (2) protect police against claims of loss or theft of property; 
ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v. Rynhart, 2005 
UT 84, ^ f 10, 125 P.3d 938. Both issues were presented below, are apparent on the 
record, and provide a proper basis for relief. 
5 
and (3) detect dangerous conditions or instrumentalities within impounded vehicles." 
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah App. 1988). 
When conducting a valid inventory search, officers are allowed to search the 
entirety of the car. "' When a legitimate search is under way . . . nice distinctions between 
. . . glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages . . . must give 
way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.'" Colorado 
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (citation omitted); accord State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 
452, 455 (Utah 1987) ("The officers were justified in searching the trunk, its contents, 
and under the hood."). In addition, officers are allowed to open and inventory any 
packages, backpacks, or bags that are discovered within the vehicle. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 
368-75; Johnson, 745 P.2d at 455. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the officer did not have an obligation to ask him 
whether he wanted to remove any property from the vehicle prior to the conducting the 
inventory search. Aplt. Br. 6-18. In Bertine, the defendant similarly argued that he had 
the right to make "alternative arrangements for the safekeeping of his property" before it 
was subjected to an inventory search. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373-74. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. "[Wjhile giving Bertine an opportunity to make alternative arrangements 
would undoubtedly have been possible . . . the real question is not what could have been 
achieved, but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps." Id. (emphasis in 
original) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Insofar as the "reasonableness of any 
particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence 
of alternative less intrusive means," the Court held that there is no such requirement in 
6 
the inventory search context. Id. at 374; accord United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 
775 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lowe, 9 F.3d 43, 46 n.4 (8th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Skillern, 947 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1991). 
In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a similar claim. Johnson, 745 P.2d 
at 454-55. Relying on Bertine, the supreme court held that the Fourth Amendment does 
not require police to allow property owners to remove personal property before it is 
subjected to an inventory search. Id, The court explained that inventory searches are 
allowed as a means of protecting police from "false claims of theft," and then held that 
this purpose would be defeated if owners were allowed to remove property prior to the 
completion of the search. Id. 
This protective need was even more pronounced in this case. Defendant did not 
own the vehicle he was driving, nor did his passenger. Once officers made the decision 
to impound the vehicle, they had a clear responsibility to protect the property interests of 
the absent owner. It would have been "countersensical" for officers to have allowed 
defendant to claim property from an absent owner's vehicle prior to at least inventorying 
the property for future reference. United States v. Penn, 233 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2000). As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "[i]t is hard to see how the owner's property can be 
protected from theft, and the police and city from claims for lost or stolen property, 
without a full listing of all items in the car before any of it is released to anyone, with a 
receipt." Id. 
The cases defendant cites in response are unavailing. For example, defendant 
relies on State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, as support for his claim that 
7 
this search violated his right to privacy. Aplt. Br. 12-13. The search at issue in 
Bissegger was a consensual search, not an inventory search, and the opinion never 
mentioned the inventory search doctrine, let alone created an exception to it for 
passenger-owned property. Id at fflf 1-21. Bissegger does not support defendant's claim 
in any way. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 68 P.3d 1052, is 
similarly misplaced. Aplt. Br. 10-11. The issue in Valdez was whether officers had 
reasonable suspicion to investigate the identity of a person who they found sleeping in a 
room while serving an arrest warrant. Id. at f^ 21. The officer in this case did not need 
reasonable suspicion to conduct this search, however, because the search was already 
justified under the inventory search doctrine. "The policies behind the warrant 
requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of 
probable cause . . . The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon 
the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no 
claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations." 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Like Bissegger, 
Valdez has no bearing on this case. 
In sum, the inventory search doctrine allows police to search a properly 
impounded vehicle and then make a complete listing of all items contained therein. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, officers are not required to allow the vehicle's occupants 
to remove property prior to beginning the inventory search. The officer therefore did not 
8 
violate defendant's constitutional rights by searching the backpack that was found sitting 
in the back seat of the vehicle. 
B. The search at issue was also justified as a search incident to the 
arrest of defendant's passenger. 
Even if the inventory search was constitutionally improper, the search was still 
justified as a search incident to the arrest of defendant's passenger. 
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, officers may search the interior of a 
vehicle if an occupant has been arrested. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 
(1981). Officers are specifically allowed to "examine the contents of any containers 
found within the passenger compartment," including "luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and 
the like." Id. at 460, 460 n.4. In this case, defendant's passenger was "arrested for 
giving false personal information" to the officer, and the challenged evidence was later 
discovered in a backpack that was on the backseat at the time of the stop. Aplt. Br. 5. 
Given this, both the vehicle and the backpack were properly subject to search incident to 
the arrest of defendant's passenger. 
In response, defendant argues that the search incident to arrest doctrine is 
inapplicable because he was not actually placed under arrest until after the search had 
uncovered his illegal substances. Aplt. Br. 15. "'A search of an arrestee's person is 
valid without a warrant, despite the fact that it shortly precedes the arrest, so long as the 
arrest and the search are substantially contemporaneous and probable cause to effect the 
arrest exists independent of the evidence seized in the search.'" State v. Hogue, 2007 UT 
App 86, ^ f 10, 157 P.3d 826 (citation omitted). Defendant has not argued that the 
9 
passenger's arrest was so "remote in time or place from the rest" so as to have 
invalidated the search pursuant to that arrest, however, so this claim should accordingly 
be rejected. State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Utah App. 1997) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). 
Defendant also claims that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not allow 
officers to search the belongings of the vehicle's occupants. Aplt. Br. 15. Though the 
Supreme Court did not address this precise issue in Belton, the plain language of the 
opinion allows officers to search the entirety of a car without any exemption for property 
that is owned by other occupants. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-61. Belton's silence is 
telling. "[I]f the rule of law that [Belton] announced were limited to contents belonging 
to the driver, or contents other than those belonging to passengers, one would have 
expected that substantial limitation to be expressed." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 301-02 (1999). It was not, and the Supreme Court has not established such an 
exception in any subsequent search incident to arrest decision. 
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this claim, however, in the related 
context of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. In 
Houghton, the issue on appeal was whether officers who are searching a vehicle for 
contraband can search the belongings of a passenger who is not otherwise suspected of 
engaging in illegal activity. Id. at 299. The Court held that such searches are 
constitutionally permissible. The Court noted that a "car passenger . . . will often be 
engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing 
the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing." Id. at 305. Further, "once a 'passenger's 
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property' exception to car searches became widely known, one would expect passenger-
confederates to claim everything as their own." Id. The Court accordingly held that it 
would not be "consistent. . . with the balance of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" 
to allow passengers to shield their property from an otherwise valid vehicular search. Id. 
at 302. 
A number of lower courts have applied Houghton to the search incident to arrest 
doctrine, thereby allowing officers to search the belongings of all the passengers within a 
vehicle if one passenger has been validly arrested. In State v. Steele, 613 N.W.2d 825 
(S.D. 2000), for example, the driver of a speeding vehicle was arrested after refusing to 
submit to a breathalyzer. Id. at 826. As the officers began searching the vehicle incident 
to this arrest, the defendant, who had been a passenger in the vehicle, attempted to 
remove her purse. Id. The officers did not allow her to remove the purse and 
subsequently found illegal drugs in the purse while searching it. Id. On appeal, the 
South Dakota Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that as a non-arrested 
passenger, her property was exempt from the search incident to the driver's arrest. 
Applying Houghton, the Steele court noted that if it adopted the defendant's theory, "'a 
driver could simply hand over all weapons and contraband to his passenger, or the 
passenger could claim ownership of any containers in the vehicle, and avoid detection.'" 
Id. at 829 (citation omitted). In the court's view, this would "nullif[y]" the purposes of 
the search incident to arrest doctrine as set forth in Belton. Id. at 827. 
In State v. Pallone, 613 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2000), the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
considered a similar case in which police had arrested a vehicle's driver for driving 
11 
under the influence. Id. at 572-73. When the defendant (who had been a passenger in 
the vehicle) tried removing his own duffle bag from the vehicle, the police refused to 
allow him to remove it, claiming that the bag was subject to search incident to the 
driver's arrest. Id. at 573. When officers searched the duffle bag, they discovered 
cocaine. Id. at 574. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the defendant's 
claim that his property was exempt from search. Noting that Belton allowed for the 
search of any containers located within the interior of a car, the court held that the 
proposed passenger exception would "overlook the reality that weapons and evidence 
can reside in passenger property just as easily as they can in arrestee belongings." Id. at 
581. "If this court were to adopt such a rule, we would provide vehicle occupants with 
the incentive to sabotage an otherwise legal search by concealing weapons or evidence in 
areas that remain within an occupant's easy reach." Id. Given this, the court held that 
the search was proper. Id. A number of other courts that have considered the question 
have reached the same result. See State v. Lopez, 10 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ariz. App. 2000); 
State v. Holland, 15 P.3d 1167, 1171 (Idaho 2000); State v. Ray, 620 N.W.2d 83, 88-89 
(Neb. 2000). 
While some courts have admittedly endorsed defendant's proposed exception for 
passenger-claimed property, such decisions have been predicated on a larger critique of 
the search incident to arrest doctrine itself. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959-
63 (N.J. 1994); Commonwealth v. Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 129-32 (Penn. 1995). Utah's 
courts have consistently sustained the validity of the search incident to arrest doctrine, 
however, so decisions such as Pierce and Shiflet have little precedential value in this 
12 
case. See, e.g., State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-20 (Utah 1997); State v. 
Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, ffif 10-11, 69 P.3d 293. 
In sum, the search incident to arrest doctrine allows officers to search the interior 
of a car, including all bags found therein, when one of the occupants is subject to arrest. 
Defendant's passenger was arrested for providing officers with false identification, and 
the challenged evidence was subsequently found in a backpack that was located on the 
backseat at the time of the stop. Even if this Court holds that the inventory search was 
improper, this Court should still hold that the search was proper as a search incident to 
the arrest of defendant's passenger and therefore affirm the result below. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
Defendant also suggests that he was unconstitutionally seized when officers 
ordered him to exit the vehicle and wait for them to finish their search. Aplt. Br. 18. 
"[0]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police 
officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the fourth 
Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures." Pennsylvania v. Mirnms, 434 U.S. 
106, 111 n.6 (1977). In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), the Supreme Court 
further explained that officers may order the driver and passengers "to get out of the car 
pending completion of the stop." Id. at 414-15. Defendant does not contest the validity 
of the stop, so the officer's request that he exit the vehicle "pending completion of the 
stop" was therefore constitutionally appropriate as well. 
In any event, the criminal charge at issue does not stem from anything that officers 
discovered on defendant during the post-stop period, but instead stems from contraband 
that officers discovered within the vehicle during the post-stop investigatory search. 
Thus, even if defendant had been allowed to leave, the same evidence would still have 
been discovered in the car and defendant would ultimately have been subjected to the 
same charges. The error, if any, was harmless. 
13 
Respectfully submitted September 18,2007. 
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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